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AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF AN ALL
COMPETITIVE LEASING SYSTEM ON ONSHORE
OIL AND GAS LEASING REVENUE
JOHN W. SPRAGUE AND BERNADETTE JULIANt
The objective of this article is to develop some indication of the
extent to which the present onshore non-competitive leasing system
provides the government with a fair return for the disposal of feder-
ally owned oil and gas resources. The article does not constitute a
wide-ranging study covering all facets of a fair market value concept.
Rather, it focuses more narrowly on the single aspect of leasing
revenues. This is done on the basic premise that if the establishment
of features more commonly associated with a competitive system of
resource allocation in the present federal onshore leasing system re-
sults in a sizeable increase in leasing revenues of and by itself, then
this fact becomes a basis on which to consider in more depth the
ability of the non-competitive leasing system to yield a fair market
value in the broader sense.
This article represents a first effort at evaluating the revenue ef-
fects of an all competitive leasing system. Using the distribution of
the number of competitive and non-competitive leases issued in one
year, this analysis attempts to project a range of bonus values based
on limited statistical inputs. Further work is needed to arrive at firm
conclusions. Failure to realize fair market value can lead to loss of
socially justifiable revenue to the federal government and, under rev-
enue sharing laws, to state governments as well. Included is an evalua-
tion of the impact of the 1960 rent increase on non-competitively
leased lands, using readily available data. The analysis covers the
United States as a whole, and also treats the State of Alaska sep-
arately. The information developed in this section is later employed
as a base for evaluating the impact of possible additional rental in-
creases. In the analysis of the possible impact of an all-competitive
leasing system, the flows of rental, royalty, and bonus income are
evaluated separately under both the present onshore competitive
leasing system and under various alternatives.
I
BACKGROUND
All oil and gas leases for federal lands, lying outside the boundaries
t Senior Economist and Economist, respectively, Branch of Mineral Economics, Division
of Energy and Minerals, Bureau of Land Management, Department of the Interior. The
opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the
Department of the Interior.
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of areas determined by by geological survey to be a known geological
structure of a producing oil or gas field, are presently issued on a
non-competitive basis. Available Bureau of Land Management statis-
tics indicate that this system of non-competitive leasing accounts for
the overwhelming majority of all oil and gas acreage presently leased
on public lands. Figures on total acreage leased on a competitive and
non-competitive basis were published for the first time in Fiscal Year
1967 when almost nine million acres were leased on a non-
competitive basis and about 60,000 acres on a competitive basis. In
addition, all acreage leased on a competitive basis since 1960 (with
no allowance for terminations) represents less than one percent of a
total acreage under lease in 1967. Thus, the gross rental and acreage
statistics available for analysis primarily reflect a non-competitive
leasing system.
Likewise, most royalty revenue also originates from lands leased
non-competitively. Only those lands which the Geological Survey has
classified as lying within a known geologic structure of a producing
oI or gas field are leased competitively. Consequently, when oil is
discovered on lands outside of such structures, the lands are usually
already under lease. The more desirable lands of such an area are
usually leased non-competitively, either for brokerage purposes or to
assemble acreage for drilling. Competitive leasing also often involves
terminated leases which have been surrendered.' As royalty statistics
are maintained on a gross basis, it is not readily possible to quantify
any shifts in present royalty trends likely to result from the adoption
of an all-competitive leasing system, because the present non-compet-
itive system employs a flat royalty of 12 percent, whereas the
present competitive system employs a sliding-scale royalty ranging
from 12 to 25 percent keyed to average monthly production. To
project royalty trends under an all-competitive system, it would be
necessary to determine the present array of sliding-scale royalties on
competitive leases and extrapolate this array to all wells on non-com-
petitive leases. The extent of readily available data does not permit
this undertaking to be performed in any meaningful way. As a result,
the analysis in this paper of royalty income under an all-competitive
leasing system is conducted on a qualitative basis.
A. The Present Leasing System
The present leasing system for oil and gas leases is based on the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. The act limits lease holdings to
246,000 acres per person, association, or corporation in any one
1. Bell Creek, located in Southeastern Montana, is a recent example of an area originally
leased in large part on a non-competitive basis that later became productive.
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state of which no more than 200,000 acres may be held under op-
tion. Somewhat higher acreage limitations are in effect for Alaska. As
stated earlier, only lands classified in a known geologic structure are
eligible for competitive leasing. By definition, the known geologic
structure of a producing oil or gas field is the trap, whether structural
or stratigraphic, in which an accumulation of oil and gas has taken
place and is being produced or is producible. All acreage that is
presumably productive is included within the limits of such a struc-
ture. A known geologic structure may, however, be more extensive
than the pools of oil or gas it may contain. Only after evaluating all
controlling factors is the known geologic structure defined. If, during
development of several individual fields, it is determined that these
separate fields are within the same geologic structure, such fields are
consolidated into a single area and that area is defined as the known
geologic structure of a single field.2
Non-competitive leases are obtained by application on a first-
come-first-served basis. A $10.00 filing fee is required and is retained
as a service charge even if the applicant's offer is rejected or with-
drawn. In the case of multiple filings for the same lands, a drawing is
held to determine the successful lessee. Rent on non-competitive
leases (lands wholly outside of known geologic structures) is set by
regulation at $.50 an acre or fraction thereof for each lease year.' If
discovery results, the law sets royalty on production at 121/2 percent.
Non-competitive oil and gas leases may not be extended at the ex-
piration of the initial ten year term except in the case of production;
or by unitization, drilling, or partial assignment. Finally, if there is
no well capable of producing oil or gas in paying quantities and the
lessee fails to pay the required rent, the lease expires. Land included
in leases so expired then becomes available for leasing again.
B. Past Trends in the Non-competitive Leasing System
Throughout the late 1940's and 1950's there was a steady and
significant increase in total leases, total acreage leased, and total rent
revenues from public lands. Much of this land was obtained for bro-
kerage purposes, and much of the land so obtained was of a less
desirable quality. Clawson and Held claimed that by the mid-50's,
many gullible persons had been drawn into the non-competitive
leasing picture, primarily to the benefit of the lease broker.4
In 1960, the rent on non-competitively leased acreage was raised
2. The Definition of Known Geologic Structures of Producing Oil and Gas Fields, Geo-
logical Survey Circular 419.
3. The law requires a rental of not less than. $.50 per acre.
4. Clawson and Held, The Federal Lands 422 (1957).
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to its present level of $.50 per acre and the initial lease period exten-
ded from 5 years to 10 years. Prior to this, annual fees had been $.50
per acre in the first year of the lease, no charge in the second and
third years, and $.25 per acre in the fourth and fifth years. If the
lease was renewed, for each succeeding year the annual rent was $.50
per acre. Thus, the increase raised the first five years rental fee for an
acre of land from $1.00 to $2.50. Shortly after this rent increase, all
indicators of leasing activities on the public lands began to decline
for the first time in many years, as indicated in Table I infra.
Table I
UNITED STATES
ACREAGE LEASED, RENTS, AND LEASES IN EFFECT
FISCAL YEAR 1960-67
(000)
Year Acreage Leased Estimated Rentsa  Leases in Effect
1960 113,675 .$27,498 139.6
1961 101,717 40,495 132.9
1962 93,298 31,655 130.0
1963 75,504 38,113 114.0
1964 67,372 37,722 104.5
1965 64,157 35,529 100.4
1966 61,270 33,379 98.2
1967 54,855 31,217 91.3
a. Rents are estimated by deducting royalties and bonuses from total receipts from public
lands. Royalty income from public lands on a fiscal year basis is included in the figures for
total Geological Survey receipts deposited to the Bureau of Land Management and cannot
be segregated from the total receipts figure. Therefore, calendar year royalty data for public
lands was used in lieu of fiscal year data to ensure that all data applied strictly to public
lands. Despite this, the rental figures shown above are considered valid in showing general
trends.
Source: Bureau of Land Management and U. S. Geological Survey data.
From this table, it can be seen that the rent increase was followed
by an immediate and fairly intensive shift away from non-compet-
itively leased lands. Given the pattern of lease holdings at this time,
some reduction in lease acreage was almost inevitable. The rent in-
crease, along with other factors such as increased interest in offshore
oil and a drop in drilling activity onshore, apparently provided the
incentive for the shift. Acreage leased and leases in effect dropped
steadily in all years shown in Table I. Rental income, on the other
hand, actually increased between 1962 and 1963, and overall, the
decline in rental has been far less severe than the drop in acreage and
number of leases.
In Table II infra, separate figures for Alaska indicate that much of
the decrease in total United States figures after 1960 was caused by a
general decline in Alaska leasing activities. Following a very active
period (1950-1960) in which the number of Alaska leases rose from
[Vol. I0
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Table 11
ALASKA
LEASES IN EFFECT, RENTS, AND ACREAGE LEASED
FISCAL YEARS 1960-67
Year Leases in Effect Estimated Rentsa (000) Acreage Leased (000)
1960 16,547 $2,784 34,908
1961 13,109 3,748 26,813
1962 10,655 6,082 -21,188
1963 7,713 5,971 15,006
1964 6,186 6,321 11,006
1965 5,496 3,788 10,047
1966 5,456 4,917 9,777
1967 3,883 4,349 7,112
a. See n.a. Table 1.
Source: Bureau of Land Management data.
9 to 16,547 and acreage under lease climbed from 19,000 to almost
35,000,000, activity in Alaska declined considerably.
Prior to 1960, rent on Alaskan leases was lower than rent on leases
outside Alaska. The 1960 rent increase, then, was proportionately
greater for Alaskan leaseholders. In the 1950's, with the then terri-
tory awaiting statehood, there was an unusual amount of interest in
lease activity in Alaska. In addition, there was increasing optimism
because of the discovery of the first commercial field in Alaska in
1956. Between 1960 and 1967, as shown in Table II, leases in effect
in Alaska fell by over 75 percent, Alaskan acreage under lease fell by
about 80 percent, and rentals showed sharp up and down move-
ments, finally increasing about 20 percent between 1960 and 1967.
Much of the decline in leases and acreage occurred in the first 3 years
after the rent increase. Since 1963, the trends in leases and acreage in
Alaska have been more in line with the overall United States trends,
indicating that the higher level of leasing activity in Alaska in the
1950's was compensated for rather quickly after Alaskan rents were
brought into line with rents for the rest of the nation. The morato-
rium placed on Alaskan leasing by the Secretary of the Interior and
state selections have also had an effect on the decline in recent years.
Table III infra shows the trend in acreage leased and leases in effect
on public lands excluding Alaska. A comparison of the decline in the
categories shown above with the same figures for Alaska in Table 11
shows the impact of Alaskan trends on overall United States figures.
With Alaska included, total acreage leased declined almost 53 percent
between 1960 and 1967; exluding Alaska, it declined 41 percent.
Similarly, leases in effect including Alaska declined 35 percent; ex-
cluding Alaska the decline was 29 percent. In the case of rents,
between 1961 and 1967 total rent including Alaska declined about
July 19701
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Table III
UNITED STATES EXCLUDING ALASKA
ACREAGE LEASED, ESTIMATED RENTS, AND LEASES IN EFFECT
FISCAL YEARS 1960-67
(000)
Year Acreage Leased Estimated Rentsa Leases in Effect
1960 78,767 $24,714 123.1
1961 74,904 36,747 119.8
1962 72,110 25,573 119.3
1963 60,498 32,142 106.3
1964 56,366 31,401 98.3
1965 54,110 31,741 94.9
1966 51,493 28,462 92.7
1967 46,743 26,868 87.4
a. See n.a. Table I.
Source: Bureau of Land Management and U. S. Geological Survey data.
23 percent; excluding Alaska, about 27 percent. This indicates that
although acreage and leases declined faster in Alaska, the larger rent
increase there helped minimize the. decline in the total rental
revenues.
Given the extent of leasing activity on public lands, both in Alaska
and elsewhere, and the increased competition for capital provided by
the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), it seems likely that a decrease in
total United States leasing activity would have occurred without the
rent increase, although perhaps not to the same degree or over the
same time span. However, it appears that the rental increase may
have actually increased rental income over what would have existed
in its absence, and served to minimize a decline in rental revenues
which would have occurred in any case. In addition, the rent increase
has, to some extent, placed lease-holding on a more rational basis by
decreasing brokerage activity, (especially in Alaska) and, by so doing,
may have provided additional incentive to oil exploration. It may be
that the low rentals on non-competitive leases prior to 1960 favored
the lease broker over the developer if these low rentals permitted the
lessee to hold large quantities of land solely for the purpose of ne-
gotiating a fee for development rights. This fee would normally be
paid in the form of cash and an overriding royalty, and in many cases
could be large enough to more than offset any profit potential the
lower rentals might have had to the developer.
Royalty revenue from public land oil and gas operations is shown
in Table IV below for calendar years 1954-67. There was an un-
usually sharp increase in royalty income between 1960 and 1961,
and then a small decline in 1962, the only such decline in the
1960-67 period. Overall, the absolute trend in royalty revenue since
the rental increase shows no marked difference with the trend in the
(Vol. 10
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Table IV
ROYALTY REVENUE, OIL AND GAS OPERATIONS ON PUBLIC LANDS
CALENDAR YEARS 1954-67
Year Royalty (000) Year Royalty (000)
1954 $39,223 1961 $68,584
1955 41,508 1962 67,377
1956 46,402 1963 71,458
1957 54,874 1964 73,186
1958 54,607 1965 74,368
1959 57,760 1966 77,829
1960 60,531 1967 83,091
Source: U. S. Geological Survey, Mineral Production, Royalty Income and Related Statis-
tics, 1967.
years just prior to 1960. Given the sharp increase in OCS activity in
the 1960-67 period however, and its resulting impact on the competi-
tion for drilling funds, the steady increase in onshore royalty income
during this period may be of some significance although the level of
aggregation of royalty statistics precludes the drawing of definitive
conclusions on the impact of the 1960 rent increase.
By the end of 1963, the major reaction to the rent increase ap-
parently ended. Since that time, there has been a steady downward
movement in rents and total acreage leased for the United States as a
whole, apparently a continuation of the trend beginning at the time
of the rent increase. This has likely been caused by continuing reac-
tion to the heavy pre-1960 leasing activity and the sharp rise of OCS
activity during the 1960's which downgraded the relative interest in
the onshore public lands as a source of oil and gas. As can be seen in
Table V, petroleum production on the OCS increased about 350
Table V
PETROLEUM PRODUCTION
PUBLIC LANDS AND OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
CALENDAR YEARS 1957-67
(Million bbls)
Year Public Lands OCS
1957 135 16
1958 137 35
1959 147 36
1960 156 50
1961 169 64
1962 171 90
1963 178 105
1964 180 123
1965 181 145
1966 187 189
1967 193 222
Source: U. S. Geological Survey, Mineral Production, Royalty Income, and Related Statis-
tics, 1967
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percent between 1960 and 1967, while production on the public
lands increased by less than 25 percent. In absolute terms, the in-
creased production from the OCS was almost five times as great as
that from public lands.
The decline in total acreage leased in the United States as a whole
has also been accompanied by an apparent shift into smaller individ-
ual holdings of land. Between 1960 and 1967, total leases issued
declined about one-third, but total acreage leased declined by over
50 percent. As a result, the average acres per lease dropped from just
over 800 in 1960 to under 600 in 1967. This decrease may have been
partly caused by efforts to adjust total rental payments to the new
rental fees and, in part, by the dropping of excess acreage previously
held by developers in an attempt to guarantee future access to
needed public lands. In addition, partial assignments by lease brokers
increased the number of lease holders.
11
THE IMPACT OF AN ALL COMPETITIVE LEASING
SYSTEM ON GOVERNMENT REVENUES
The following analysis treats the present onshore competitive
leasing system first and evaluates the likely impact on bonuses,
royalty, and rental revenue individually. Part B of this section then
goes on to evaluate the impact of various competitive leasing features
which might be substituted as alternatives to the present competitive
system.
A. The Present Competitive Leasing System
1. The Bonus
Under the competitive system, bidding produces bonus revenue.
Under the non-competitive system there is no bidding system but a
unique source of revenue originates through the filing fee system. In
converting to an all-competitive leasing system using bonus bidding,
this current non-refundable $ 10 filing fee would be eliminated. Be-
cause of this, in evaluating the true increase in revenue from an
all-competitive system, it becomes necessary to measure the tradeoff
between bonus income and the loss of filing fee revenue. "Public
Land Statistics" reports that an average of slightly over $3 million in
fees and commissions has been received from the public lands in
recent years.5 It is estimated that the oil and gas filing fee is respon-
sible for the greater part of this revenue, perhaps $22 million,6
which is the figure adopted for this analysis.
5. B.L.M., Public Land Statistics, Table 114 (1967).
6. Interior Department Ad Hoc Committee on Competitive Leasing on Federal Lands.
Report on Competitive Leasing of Federal Lands for Oil and Gas 89 (1963).
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In past years the non-competitive leasing system has also generated
a much higher volume of administrative and legal expenses than the
competitive system.7 Much of this expense arises from the practice
of multiple filings on individual lease sites and the subsequent assign-
ments of leases; the same practice generates much of the filing fee
revenues. Therefore, it appears that there is also at least a partial
trade off factor between a reduction in filing fee revenues and a
reduction in government legal and administrative expenditures, and
perhaps even a savings if these expenses are actually greater than the
revenue from filing fees.
In order to estimate the amount of bonus revenue the government
would receive, two systems of measurement can be used. In the first,
a hypothetical is set up, based on an average lease case. Because no
precise data was available, the necessary inputs to our analysis are
estimates supplied by the Geological Survey and the Bureau of Land
Management. The two inputs to determine revenue are price per unit
and quantity supplied. Using a unit price of $2.90 a barrel for oil and
23 barrels a day as average quantity supplied, annual revenue per well
is estimated at $24,000. On the average, one productive lease con-
tains about 2.5 wells, giving an annual revenue figure per productive
lease of $61,000. In addition, a twenty-five year lease life is assumed
allowing two years for development. Next, to serve as a proxy for
potential government bonus income, an average overriding royalty
figure was determined. Although no precise statistics are available in
this area, a rate between two and four percent was suggested by
knowledgeable Bureau of Land Management personnel. Using this
range to establish a 3 percent average overriding royalty, we can then
discount at 8 percent,8 the rate used here to equal the opportunity
cost to the government of accepting this money on a present value
basis. The results indicate that a 3 percent average overriding royalty
has a value of $1,826 per annum and when distributed over a period
of 25 years, has a present value of almost $17,000, as shown below:
VP =A (R- -1)
Rn r
=AxTF2 7 -AxTF2
= $1,826 (10.9352)-$1,826 (1.7833)
= $16,711
7. Nugent, Federal Mineral Leasing: A Study of Rule Making and Market Realities, 2
Department of Justice, Land and Natural Resource Division J., 18 (1964).
8. See Baumol, On the Social Rate of Discount, 58 The American Economic Review 788
(1968).
9. The formula used is based on the present value of an annuity of $1 per year at
compound interest. The percent value of $1,826 per year at compound interest for years 3
to 27 was calculated by determining the present value for years 1 to 27 minus the present
value for years 1 and 2.
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Revenue for the total number of productive leases can then be calcu-
lated by applying an average of the percentage of productive non-
competitive leases to the number of such leases issued in 1967. This
average is 7 percent and when applied to the approximately 11,000
leases issued in 1967, we get a total of 785 productive leases.' 0 The
785 leases, when multiplied by our average lease value of $16,711
yields a total bonus value of $13,113,135 for 1967. In terms of the
increase over lost filing fee revenues of $2/2 million, additional
revenue earned is in excess of $ 10 million.
The other system that can be used to estimate possible bonus
income foregone is to apply the average bonus paid per acre for lands
leased competitively under the present onshore system and apply it
to the additional acreage that might have been leased under an all
competitive system. Statistics were published for the first time in
1 967 showing the number of acres leased on a competitive basis, and
also total bonus income received. Total bonus income was $735,000
for 80,000 acres leased, or an average of $12 per acre. In the same
year 8,693,000 acres were leased non-competitively. If we assumed
that all the acreage leased non-competitively in 1967 would also have
been leased under an all competitive system and had received the
same average per acre bid, the total bonus income to the government
from this land would have been just over $104 million. This figure,
of course, must be qualified by two significant factors, as follows:
(1) Under an all competitive leasing system the total acreage
leased would have undoubtedly decreased. Based on our earlier anal-
ysis of the 1960 rent increase we saw that acreage under lease de-
clined about 50 percent. If we assumed that a shift to bonus bidding
brought about the same approximate impact, acreage leased in 1967
would have dropped from roughly 8,700,000 acres to 4,350,000
acres, and the bonus income would have been about $52 million.
(2) Our earlier analysis also stated that, in many cases, only the
less productive lands tend to be leased competitively under the pres-
ent system. If this is true, then it can be assumed that much of the
additional acreage that would have been leased competitively in 1967
under an all competitive system would have received considerably
higher per acre bonus bids than the average reflected in the 1967
figure for actual competitive leases. If 4,350,000 acres had been
leased, and if the higher bids were sufficient to increase the average
10. This figure assumes no change in the number of productive leases due to the exis-
tence of an all competitive leasing system. While later discussion assumes the total number
of leases issued might decline under such a system, it is felt that productive leases will
remain fairly constant in number, and in fact might increase.
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to $24 per acre, then total bonus income in 1967 would have still
been $104 million.
If it were assumed that the impact of items one and two above
were offsetting, our original estimate of $104 million in bonus in-
come foregone would still be accurate. Thus, our two alternative
systems of calculating bonus income foregone because of the non-
competitive leasing system sets up a possible range from about $10
million to about $100 million.
It should be pointed out that the bonus figures developed above
represent only a rough calculation to provide a wide range. In addi-
tion, they are based only on 1967 figures, which may or may not be
representative of long term leasing trends. In line with our original
thesis, however, the figures do provide a reasonable basis for at least
calling into question the ability of the present non-competitive leas-
ing system to ensure the government fair market value for the dis-
posal of its oil and gas resources.
Under an all competitive leasing system most of the increase in
bonus income would likely occur in areas where new drilling interest
had developed and leasing activity was initiated on and around the
prospective structure. Under the present system, most of the desir-
able lands in such a case are leased on a non-competitive basis before
the lands can be classified as lying within a known geological struc-
ture. As shown above, this may result in a sizeable loss of income to
which the government is entitled and which it would stand a better
chance of obtaining through competitive leasing on a cash bonus
system.
In addition, bonus bidding, by requiring cash outlays to obtain
access rights to more desirable lands, might tend to reduce the inci-
dence of overriding royalties. This, in turn, might allow developers,
even with sizeable bonus payments required, to develop these lands
more efficiently if the cash bonus payments were equal to or less
than the present value of the overriding royalties which might other-
wise be paid.' ' To the extent that present overriding royalties are
excessive, then the developer would actually pay less (on a present
value basis) to the government under a cash bonus system. Under the
present system the leaseholder may at times exact excessive pay-
ments. The bonus-bidding system could minimize the presence of the
overriding royalty and transfer much of the income which goes to
the non-competitive leaseholder under the present system to the gov-
ernment in the form of cash bonuses. In addition, the cash bonus, as
11. This would be true in the case of equal payment because the bonus does not add to
marginal costs.
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a "sunk cost" to the winning bidder, would provide an additional
incentive to early development.
Cash bonus bidding, on the other hand, raises capital barriers and
could eliminate, in part, one of the advantages of the present sys-
tem-minimal capital requirements for citizens desiring to lease the
public lands. Lease brokerage, however, already eliminates some of
this advantage to the actual developer to the extent the developer has
to pay the broker a cash bonus for the lease. Even if a bonus pay-
ment were required, however, in those vast areas of the public lands
where no structures are presently known, citizens lacking large cash
assets could still gain access to the public land, for the expected
resource value of tracts in these areas would be nominal due to the
very high degree of uncertainty associated with such properties. This
would enable them to perform such functions as they now perform,
obtaining payment for these services ii the form of cash and over-
riding royalties.
2. Rent and Royalty
A change to the competitive leasing system would, in most cases,
increase the rent on lands lying outside of known geological struc-
tures from $.50 to $2 per acre if the present competitive leasing
specifications were retained. It appears probable that this rent in-
crease would result in an increase in total rent revenue, although a
lack of statistical data prevents empirical verification of this fact. At
a $2 per acre rent, it would take a decline of more than 75 percent in
leased acreage to bring total revenue below that under the present
$.50 per acre fee. The only available data for estimating the likely
impact of such a rent increase is the trend in acreage under lease
since the 1960 rent increase. In the seven years since this rent in-
crease, acreage under lease has declined just over 50 percent. While
the 1960 increase was considerably smaller than the one envisioned
here, based on earlier analysis in this report, it is believed that the
present pattern of land holdings may be far more stable than in
1960, and therefore, the reaction to a given rent increase is likely to
be far less volatile. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that the
imposition of an annual rental of $2 per acre will not create a decline
in acreage under lease sufficient to decrease total revenue.
A switch to an all competitive leasing system would also involve
the imposition of a sliding scale royalty on production in lieu of the
present flat rate of 12 N percent if present competitive leasing specifi-
cations were retained. The sliding scale royalty ranges from 122
percent to 25 percent and is based on average monthly oil produc-
tion. It seems certain that this sliding scale royalty would increase
[Vol. 10
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royalty income to the government over and above that received
under the present 121/2 percent rate.
B. Alternatives to the Present Competitive Leasing Terms
1. Rents
Instead of the $2 per acre rate required by the present system,
there are other options open, including,' 2 (1) a general rental in-
crease to a rate less than $2 per acre; (2) a general rental increase up
to $2 per acre but with provisions to offset the rental increase against
exploration costs incurred in the same year; and (3) a sliding scale
rent, starting from a relatively low per acre change in the earlier
years, and gradually increasing to $2 or more in the later years of the
lease.
A general rental increase to less than $2 would not raise revenues
unless it was set high enough to just offset the impact of two factors
which will likely serve to decrease total acreage under lease. The first
is the decline in acreage which will inevitably occur as marginal
lessees react to the requirements for obtaining leases under a compet-
itive system. This reaction will occur independently of any rental
action and the government will lose this rental revenue which it
would have retained under a non-competitive system. The second
decline will occur as a result of a decline in rental revenues from that
acreage which would have been leased competitively in any case and
which, if a new rate of less than $2 is set, will actually experience a
decline in rental fees. In addition, any given rental increase will, of its
own accord, create an offsetting decline in acreage under lease. As
stated earlier, the 1960 rental increase was followed by a decline of
just over 50 percent. Although other factors were present, this is the
only factual evidence available on the impact of a rent increase.
Therefore, to be conservative we have assumed any future declines in
leased acreage will be at least this large. If we assume a drop of at
least 50 percent in acreage under lease, a rental rate in excess of $1
per acre would be required to increase total revenues. A $1 rate
would be needed to offset the 50 percent decline in acreage caused
by the increase, and an additional increase of some amount would be
needed to offset acreage losses resulting from increased administra-
12. The first two options use a cutoff point of $2. This figure is used because the present
competitive leasing system uses a rent of $2 and the fact that acreage is leased at this rate
indicates a willingness to pay such a rent on the part of lessees. This fact-of-life can lend
some empirical support to an analysis involving rental rates at or below the $2 rate, and as
there is insufficient data to analyze the effect of a rental in excess of $2, we have used this
figure as the cutoff point. Option 3, the sliding scale rental, allows the possibility of a rental
in excess of $2 per acre but implicitly assumes that the average rental over the life of any
lease would not exceed $2.
July 19701
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
tive requirements and rental losses from lands which would have
otherwise been competitively leased at $2 per acre. Therefore, the
range of demand elasticity is narrowed to between some amount in
excess of $1 per acre up to $2 per acre. In view of the fact that the
extent of slippage in rental due to the non-rent increase factors is
highly uncertain as well as the possibility that the rent-associated
reduction in acreage may exceed 50 percent, it seems that the op-
timum rent under this alternative would be just under, or equal to,
$2 per acre.
Under a rental increase system which included a provision to off-
set the rental increase against exploration costs, we would need to
first disaggregate lessees into two groups-lease brokers and devel-
opers-in order to fully evaluate the subsequent impact on rental
revenues. No precise figures are available as to the percentages of
total non-competitively leased acreage held by lease brokers and de-
velopers respectively. However, it is believed that lease brokers hold
the majority of such acreage (either directly or indirectly), and a
75-25 percent split in favor of lease brokers can be accepted as
reasonable. It is also believed that present holdings of development
groups are more in line with their short term requirements for legiti-
mate exploration activity than in 1960, when excess lands may have
been leased as a hedge against exclusion from needed lands by the
intensive leasing activity of the 1950's. This provision should allow
development groups to approximately trade off increased rentals
with exploration costs and should result in their land holdings re-
maining constant after any given rent increase. Lease brokers, on the
other hand, would feel the full impact of any rent increase because
they would incur no offsetting exploration costs. This should cause a
drop in acreage held by them, with the actual amount involved being
a function of the magnitude of the rent increase. However, under the
previous assumption of lease brokers holding 75 percent of non-com-
petitively leased land, the drop in acreage will probably not be suffi-
cient to cause a decline in total revenues. For example, if rental fees
were increased to $2 per acre, a decrease in land held by lease
brokers of about 75 percent would be necessary to decrease total
rental revenue if holdings of exploration groups remain constant.
Again, a minimum rate somewhat in excess of $1 would be necessary
to offset the decline in acreage from the rent and non-rent factors,
and again, our range of elasticity would be narrowed. Therefore, it
appears that the optimum rental rate for this alternative would also
be just under, or equal to, $2 per acre. The optimum rental rate
under this alternative would not likely yield as much revenue in total
as would a flat rate with no exemptions. However, the lower rentals
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envisioned under this alternative might be more than offset by the
additional incentives providzd to development groups, which might
result in the more efficient utilization of the public lands over the
long run.
A sliding scale rental, starting at a fairly low rate, and increasing
gradually each year until it equalled or exceeded $2 per acre would
probably result in the greatest slippage in rental revenue, at least in
the short run. However, graduated rental fee would likely curtail
long-term holdings of land for purely speculative purposes although
it could increase short term holdings.' ' Thus, it would create some
of the same benefits as would the system providing exploration cost
offsets against rentals.
In summary, it appears that the greatest rental increase could be
achieved by imposing a flat $2 per acre rental with no provision for
offsetting exploration costs. After that, the options appear to require
the taking of less rental revenue in return for increasing incentives to
explore and develop oil and gas properties on public lands.
2. Royalty Bidding
Given the conditions of substantial uncertainty associated with
exploration on much of the land lying outside of present known
geological structures, a system of royalty bidding might be more
likely to yield higher government revenues from the bidding process.
This is so because under conditions of substantial uncertainty, future
rent payments will be heavily discounted for this factor, and such a
process will very often result in a bonus payment far short of the
present value of actual future economic rents. Royalty bidding per-
mits the government to share some of the risk with the explorer by
predicating payments on actual future oil production which mini-
mizes both discounting for risk and potential windfall profits. In
addition, royalty bidding avoids the creation of capital barriers and
thereby allows retention of one of the major advantages of the pres-
ent non-competitive system-minimal capital requirements for access
to the public lands.
The major disadvantage of royalty bidding is that it adds to mar-
ginal costs and thus can cause premature abandonment of otherwise
economic properties, unless the royalty rate may be appropriately
adjusted. In theory, royalty bidding also does not ensure that the
most efficient producer will always obtain the lease and may encour-
age lease brokerage.
13. This is comparable to the reaction to the 1960 change in fee structures. Many who
were willing to hold a lease 3 years for $.50, i.e., about $.17 per year, would not keep it for
the fourth year ($.25) or take a lease for even one year at $.50.
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Royalty bidding also permits the government to take its bidding
revenue over time and thus increases the amount of dollars the gov-
ernment will receive over the productive life of a tract as opposed to
what it would receive in a lump sum payment of equal present value.
This difference in dollars received is a reflection of the time value of
money. In the previous bonus bidding examples (see text following
note 10, supra), it was shown that the government would have re-
ceived over $13 million in income in 1967 if it had issued all its
leases competitively, using a social discount rate of 8 percent. How-
ever, if it had issued these leases competitively under a royalty bid-
ding system, those same bids would have yielded almost $36 million
over the next 25 years because of the additional time value of
money. Theoretically, the decision to take a lump sum payment as
opposed to a royalty payment over time would be dependent on
associated social costs. For example, if the social cost of foregoing
present receipts was greater than 8 percent the government would be
better off taking the money in a lump sum. However, the determina-
tion as to what the relevant social costs are at any given point in time
is basically a function of federal fiscal policy, and as such, places
these considerations beyond the scope of this article.
3. Royalties On Production
The royalty on oil and gas production could be set as a flat percen-
tage of value rather than on a sliding scale rate keyed to monthly
output, if a bonus bidding system were utilized on the public lands.
Royalty bidding would, of course, preclude the necessity of adminis-
tratively establishing royalty rates, as they would then become a
function of the bidding process and be determined by a competitive
process.
A flat royalty rate could be set at 12/ percent (the legal minimum
and the present rate on non-competitive leases) or at some higher
rate deemed equitable, possibly a rate believed to approximate the
average royalty that would be realized under a sliding scale system.
This reduces uncertainty, transfers more emphasis to the bonus, and
increases the chances of a buyer realizing windfall profits. On the
other hand, a sliding scale royalty tends to freeze production from a
well just below the output level necessary to bring on the next in-
crease in the royalty rate, unless the maximum efficient rate will
ensure a level of output high enough to justify payment of the higher
royalty rate. As such, a sliding scale royalty may create a barrier to
efficient production.
A flat royalty also creates a barrier to full recovery of an economic
resource as it adds to marginal costs. At present, this cost may only
be lowered when the producer petitions the government to do so.
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This adverse effect of a flat royalty may be mitigated, however,
through a system of somewhat automatically declining royalty rates
timed to become effective at those output levels where marginal
costs may be expected to approach, or equal, marginal revenues. If
this were done, it would also seem equitable to attach the same
provisions to any overriding royalties placed on production.
It should be remembered, however, that a system of flat royalties
with sliding scale provisions to ensure maximum resource recovery
represents nothing more than a modified form of the full sliding-scale
system. The modified system would tend only to lower the maxi-
mum permissable royalty rate, thus requiring the government to bear
the costs necessary to ensure production at the relatively inefficient
end, but permitting no increasing share of any revenues arising from
greater than anticipated production rates.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the measurement system used in this article, an all
competitive leasing system would have increased government bonus
revenues anywhere from $10 million to $100 million in 1967, less a
loss in filing fee revenues of approximately $2/2 million." * In addi-
tion, if rental fees had been increased in line with the rates analyzed
in this article, an increase in total rental revenue would have likely
resulted.
We believe that the basic assumptions used in developing our two
bonus income estimates are essentially valid and that the results
point out two basic facts:
(1) that the present non-competitive system is not providing the
government with a fair return for the disposal of its onshore oil and
gas resources;
(2) that the actual amount of revenue foregone has not been iden-
tified with any great degree of accuracy in this report.
In addition, based on our analyses in this paper we feel that a
fairly accurate identification of revenue lost under a system confined
to bonus bidding might still not measure the time loss of revenue. It
may be that because of the high levels of risk and uncertainty in
much of the public domain land the optimum leasing system might
include a combination of royalty and bonus bidding. That is, bonus
bidding with a fixed royalty in those areas exhibiting relatively favor-
able geological probabilities and royalty bidding on rank wildcat
acreage.
14. This deducts the entire filing fee revenue with no offset for associated expenditures
to obtain a net bonus figure. Inclusion of such expenditures would, of course, increase the
figures used above, and if expenditures actually exceeded filing fee revenues, the low and
high points of the range in government bonus revenue shown above would increase.
, July 19701
